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The claim of psychoanalysis t o be a psychological science has been under challenge since its very beginning. The logical positivists, Karl Popper and most recently Adolf Grunbaum,' have all questioned the possibility of a psychoanalytic science. In general their arguments have led to the conclusion that psychoanalysis, by its very nature, cannot lead to objective truths about the functioning of the human mind. They follow in the footsteps of Wittgenstein' who accused Freud of confusing causes and reasons and of incorrectly naming his discipline 'scientific'. For example, Grunbaum argues that psychoanalysis cannot lead to causal explanations by itself because its methods of enquiry, such as free association and successful interpretation, are inherently 'contaminated' by suggestion. Implicit in these critiques is the notion of scientific knowledge as something that is objectively reliable and valid. Science is viewed as a form of discourse that secretes universal truths about the world and ourselves. Science is seen as a radically unique activity, differentiated from political discourse, religion, literature and so on. Recent defenders of the 'scientific' status of psychoanalysis have accepted this notion of science but have argued for the inclusion of psychoanalysis within its domain.
Waller~tein,~ in a response to the 'New Challenges', asserts that the 'truths' of psychoanalysis are objective and thus open to empirical testing. Thus he says that even though there will be difficulties 'there is sufficient warrant for such empirical testing in ways that are alert to the subtlety and complexity of s u b j e c t i v e c l i n i c a l p h e n o m e n a while simultaneously loyal to the canons of objective scientific method'. In this view the possibility of empirical testing saves psychoanalysis from being a redundant intellectual exercise and allows it to proclaim its value as a scientific discipline. Edwin W a l l a~e ,~ while denying Grunbaum's claim that psychoanalytic technique is invariably suggestive and 'placebogenic', agrees with Grunbaum that calling psychoanalysis anything other than science would be its 'kiss of death'. Thus Wallace implicitly upholds the separation of science from other forms of human enquiry. In particular, science is to be differentiated from 'the hermenutic acausal approach'. Again the value of psychoanalysis is seen to reside in its supposed ability to yield objective 'causal' knowledge of the human world.
This radical separation of science from other forms of human activity is problematic. A purely logical science would be virtually sterile. Progress in science depends on innovation and imagination. The French philosopher of science G a s t o n Bachelard' a r g u e d t h a t a n 'epistemological obstacle' arises if a strict separation of imagination and science is made. New insights in science depend on intuition and often fantasy. For example, the molecular structure of benzine was arrived at by Kekule as a result of seeing a mental image of a ring, a snake biting its tail. Scientific knowledge does not change solely according to the dictates of logical rationality. The fact that it is impossible to even conceive what world view science will proclaim in a hundred years' time is testimony to this. If progress was always stepwise and logical then we should at least be able to conceive the broad outlines of such science at the present time.
The work of Thomas Kuhn' has shown that I38 SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS indeed the history of science cannot be viewed as a stepwise march towards an objective 'truth'. He argues that the history of science is the story of changing 'paradigms'. Theory a n d observation always occur within the confines of such paradigms and, most importantly, paradigm shifts do not occur simply through falsifying comparisons with nature. He argues that 'the act of judgement that leads scientists to reject a paradigm is always simultaneous with that which accepts another'. For Kuhn this shift is 'non-rational' and no logical argument can, of itself, defend one paradigm against another. Thus, although scientific knowledge has developed as a series of revolutions, there can be no transhistorical or transcultural criterion for explaining the succession of these revolutions. Since no transhistorical criterion or standard of validity and rationality exists, all scientific paradigms are incommensurate. In other words, the problem of paradigm choice is in the same psychological realm as political choice or religious conversion, and the history of science becomes comparable to the history of literature, art and the other humanities.
In parallel to Kuhn's work in the history of natural science, the French philosopher Michel Foucault has argued that the human and social sciences also lack transhistorical a n d transcultural criteria of validity. One of Foucault's aims is to locate the origins of these sciences in specific cultural and economic periods. He argues, for example,' that psychiatry only became possible after madness had been separated from sanity during the Enlightenment. Prior to this, madness was situated not in opposition to sanity but at its outer regions, at the 'ultimate regions' of our experience. Indeed, prior to the Enlightenment madness was often associated with sacred forms of knowledge. The elaboration of a science of psychopathology only became possible within a general cultural definition of madness as morbid. Thus prior to and underlying our scientific psychiatric knowledge is a deeper cultural perception of madness as disease. It is only on the basis of this a priori that we can search for causes and explanations of our different psychopathological entities. However, the fundamental and essential movefrom viewing madness as a form of experience 'at the limits of the world' to viewing it as disease and the proper object of scientific enquiryhappened unconsciously and without appeal to rationality. For Foucault knowledge is always a manifestation of power and the fact that the knowledge proclaimed by a particular discourse is dominant in a particular culture is evidence that the power forms immanent in this discourse are dominant. He argues that we should cease to see power in 'negative terms, it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "marks", it "conceals". In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.'8 All knowledge, according to Foucault, whether it be biology, history or psychology, is united by this fact. For him demarcations between discourses are also peculiar to different cultural configurations and the assignment of a discourse to the category 'Science' cannot be based on an appeal to a universally valid criterion of science but is rather a function of the development and historical position of the discourse.
Returning to psychoanalysis: if we accept the Kuhnian and Foucauldian vision of knowledge development, we see that it is untenable to defend psychoanalysis by appealing to its ultimate scientific validity. Within this vision there is no such thing as a universal model of science by which it can be judged. We should rather assert that psychoanalysis, like physics, chemistry or biology, is a discourse that provides insights into the operations of the world and our place within it but does not and cannot provide transhistorical and transcultural truths. We should acknowledge that psychoanalysis allows us to elaborate and create knowledge of our world but does not lead to discoveries of objective facts that are universally applicable. Freud's approach to dream interpretation allows us to create a meaning for our dreams and thus gives us knowledge that renders us more 'powerful' in terms of emotional articulation. The dream of Irma's injection, the first dream 'successfully' interpreted by Freud, takes one page of text to recount but Freud spends the next 16 pages elaborating and expanding on its associations and references. It is as though he inflates the manifest dream with meaning. Before Freud and particularly subsequent to him dream interpretation has been a valuable tool of the psychotherapist. Dream interpretation opens up areas for discussion and articulation and its benefits reside, I suggest, in this, its creative aspect, rather than in the discovery of elusive unconscious causative wishes. Elsewhere' I have pointed to the creative use made by the Surrealists of various psychoanalytic techniques. Andre Breton, chief theoretician of this movement, argued in his book Les Vases Communicants for the therapeutic efficacy of dream usage in art. He states that a person, endowed with any artistic gift, can 'rather than transform his dreams into symptoms, transform them into artistic creations. Thus, he can escape the fate of neurosis and, through this detour, make contact with reality.' Thus I believe that traditional defences of psychoanalytic scientificity are misguided. The sharp division of science from hermenutic enquiry which underlies these approaches is untenable. Contemporary philosophy underlines the historical and cultural relativity of all scientific knowledge, and the essentially intuitive and non-rational basis upon which major shifts occur in such knowledge. To aspire to a psychoanalytic science that is empirically testable is to aspire to an outmoded concept of science. Psychoanalysis is a method whereby we can elaborate valuable knowledge about ourselves. Its truths, like the 'truths' of all sciences, are never universally valid but can be of enormous immediate benefit. Psychoanalysis provides a basis for emotional articulation and empathy and as such its value for human beings is a s s u r e d . T h e a t t e m p t t o c o n f i n e psychoanalysis within an outmoded concept of science would be, I believe, contrary to Wallace, its 'kiss of death'.
